Common Pool Politics and Inefficient Fishery Management.

Hoffmann, Julia and Quaas, Martin (2016) Common Pool Politics and Inefficient Fishery Management. Environmental and Resource Economics, 63 (1). pp. 79-93. DOI 10.1007/s10640-014-9842-4.

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Abstract

Fisheries management often fails because total allowable catches (TACs) are set at inefficiently high levels. To study why decision-makers choose such high TACs, we model the annual negotiation on TACs as a dynamic game in discrete time. TACs are fixed by majority decision in a council consisting of decision-makers who are heterogeneous with respect to their discount rates. We show that the optimal feedback strategy for the less patient decision-makers will set inefficiently high TACs in Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. A binding commitment to a long-term management plan could help solving this problem and lead to a more sustainable fishery management.

Document Type: Article
Keywords: Fisheries Fishery economics Environmental uncertainty Constant escapement Political economy Dynamic game theory
Research affiliation: OceanRep > The Future Ocean - Cluster of Excellence > FO-R03
Kiel University
Kiel University > Kiel Marine Science
OceanRep > The Future Ocean - Cluster of Excellence
OceanRep > The Future Ocean - Cluster of Excellence > FO-R02
Refereed: Yes
Open Access Journal?: No
DOI etc.: 10.1007/s10640-014-9842-4
ISSN: 0924-6460
Projects: Future Ocean
Date Deposited: 30 Jan 2017 10:20
Last Modified: 23 Sep 2019 19:46
URI: http://oceanrep.geomar.de/id/eprint/35522

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