Bahr, Gunter and Requate, Till (2014) Reciprocity and Giving in a Consecutive Three-Person Dictator Game with Social Interaction. German Economic Review, 15 (3). pp. 374-392. DOI 10.1111/geer.12013.

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Abstract

We study pure indirect reciprocity by setting up a modified dictator game with three players A, B, and C acting sequentially. Subject A takes a share of a pie and passes the rest to subject B, while B divides the rest between herself and C. We find that this consecutive three-person dictator game increases generosity compared with the traditional two-person dictator game. We analyze the influence of social interaction and uncertainty. In treatments with certainty we observe pure indirect reciprocity: B indirectly reciprocates for A's behavior in the decision on how generous to be to C.

Document Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Times Cited: 0 0
Keywords:	Pure indirect reciprocity dictator game social interaction
Research affiliation:	OceanRep > The Future Ocean - Cluster of Excellence OceanRep > The Future Ocean - Cluster of Excellence > FO-R03 OceanRep > The Future Ocean - Cluster of Excellence > FO-R02 Kiel University
Refereed:	Yes
Open Access Journal?:	No
Publisher:	John Wiley & Sons: Blackwell Publishing
Projects:	Future Ocean
Date Deposited:	30 Mar 2015 11:57
Last Modified:	23 Sep 2019 17:44
URI:	https://oceanrep.geomar.de/id/eprint/27117

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