A framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with Ethiopian farmers.

Reichhuber, Anke, Camacho, Eva and Requate, Till (2009) A framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with Ethiopian farmers. Environment and Development Economics, 14 (05). p. 641. DOI 10.1017/S1355770X09005178.

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Abstract

We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments.

Document Type: Article
Research affiliation: Kiel University > Kiel Marine Science
OceanRep > The Future Ocean - Cluster of Excellence
Kiel University
Refereed: Yes
Open Access Journal?: No
Publisher: Elsevier
Projects: Future Ocean
Date Deposited: 01 Mar 2018 13:39
Last Modified: 24 Sep 2019 03:49
URI: https://oceanrep.geomar.de/id/eprint/42088

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